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Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction

Kim Lane Scheppele

W

hen the well-known paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould
was diagnosed with a rare form of cancer, he was told by his doctor
that he had eight months to live. But being a scientist who understood statistics, he realized that the doctor was telling him the central tendency of a distribution rather than an individualized
prediction of the trajectory of his individual life. And what he
cared about, being human, was not aggregate rates of mortality but
what was going to happen to him. He wanted to know what he could
concretely do to increase the likelihood of living longer. For this,
the general statistics were not particularly helpful because they
only indicated a simple correlation between the date of diagnosis
and the date of death. They said nothing about all of the other
factors that would allow some particular case to be out in the long
tail of the mortality distribution, which is where a particular individual would want to be. So Gould set about trying to disaggregate
the statistics, noting:
Variation is the hard reality, not a set of imperfect measures for a
central tendency. Means and medians are the abstractions. . . . I
had to place myself amidst the variation. (Gould 1991:476)

Unpredictable things occurred that made his prognosis betterF
new cancer regimens became available; he noted that having a
good attitude helped. Having been diagnosed with less than a year
to live, Gould managed to thrive another 20 years before succumbing to an entirely different form of cancer (Dunn 2002).
I would like to thank Joe Sanders, Nita Lineberry, Bert Kritzer, and Dianne Sattinger
for organizing the complicated process at the Law & Society Review from which guest editors
benefit, and Bert Kritzer in particular for constructive comments on this introduction. I
would also like to thank the authors whose work appears in this issue for putting up with so
many requests for revision, for handling these requests gracefully, and for helping me
work out what I meant in the first place by constitutional ethnography. Finally, I would like
to thank Serguei Oushakine for his theoretical insight and ethnographic support. Please
address correspondence to Kim Lane Scheppele, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104; e-mail: kimlane@law.upenn.edu.

Law & Society Review, Volume 38, Number 3 (2004)
r 2004 by The Law and Society Association. All rights reserved.

390

Constitutional Ethnography

Gould’s lesson also applies to constitutional regimes. The
scholar, the citizen, and the politician typically care about constitutional orders one at a time, as individuals care about their own
life trajectories. And sometimes the unexpected and the contingent
matter more than the broad patterns in determining what occurs in
individual cases. It does only a limited amount of good, therefore,
to say that the life expectancy of a regime with proportional representation in the legislature is higher than the life expectancy of a
regime with winner-take-all election districts. Or that certain judicial selection mechanisms are correlated with a particular sort of
judicial activism. What most people want to know about constitutions is whether Germany or Taiwan or Nigeria would do better if
their constitutions contained these features, not just whether regimes on average work better with one design rather than another.
Or alternatively, one may want to know what the distinctive problems are of particular constitutional arrangements (for example,
the instability that can be caused by unconstrained votes of no
confidence or the dangers that follow when the executive alone can
declare a state of emergency) so that one can protect against constitutional pathologies. For this, knowing how constitutional regimes fare on a handful of variables abstracted from context may
say little. New knowledge may come on-line over the course of a
constitutional trajectory; particular features of the individual state
help or hurt in ways that cannot be corralled in any model.
The urgent issue in constitutional studies typically is to know
whether the experiences of some constitutional settings are helpful
for understanding othersFand that will depend on how similar
other systems are to one’s own, whether they have dealt with the
same sort of historical problems, whether they have drawn their
constitutional ideas from the same well. Of course, one can come
closer to being useful in this way by simply having a model with
more variables. In general, however, the study of individual polities
up close and in detail is nearly always more helpful for those concerned with the foibles and fates of particular constitutional regimes than ambitious multivariate models in this field, given that
the number of relevant countries is typically smaller than the
number of relevant variables one would want to take into account.
The more one is interested in particular constitutional dilemmas
and the knowledge that can be brought to bear on understanding
them, the more one may be drawn to constitutional ethnography.
Constitutional ethnography does not ask about the big correlations
between the specifics of constitutional design and the effectiveness
of specific institutions but instead looks to the logics of particular
contexts as a way of illuminating complex interrelationships among
political, legal, historical, social, economic, and cultural elements.
The goal of constitutional ethnography is to better understand how
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constitutional systems operate by identifying the mechanisms through
which governance is accomplished and the strategies through which
governance is attempted, experienced, resisted and revised, taken
in historical depth and cultural context. While any one specific
constitutional setting has distinctive and ungeneralizable features,
each constitutional context also has logics that link various specific
features found in the particular case into patterns whose traces may
also be visible elsewhere with different specific manifestations.
While constitutional ethnography emphasizes the particular, it
has theoretical ambition. Theory is ‘‘a precursor, medium and
outcome of ethnography study and writing’’ (Willis & Trondman
2000:7). Theory-building in this view, then, comes not from hypothesis testing, but instead from noting complex relationships in
one setting and then seeing how far other settings can be understood in those same terms. Such comparisons inevitably produce
modifications that result from consideration of that next case,
which can then be used in analyzing further cases, and so on. In the
end, what one has is not a universal one-size-fits-all theory or an
elegant model that abstracts away the distinctive, but instead a set
of repertoires that can be found in real cases and that provide insight
into how constitutional regimes operate. Learning the set of repertoires that constitutional ethnography reveals, one can see more
deeply into particular cases. In addition, one has a sense of what to
expect in the future, though given the historical contingency of
particular settings, one cannot predict in a strict sense. Constitutional ethnography has as its goal, then, not prediction but comprehension, not explained variation but thematization.
In this issue of the Law & Society Review, many countries, questions, and methodologies are on display. Because of the ethnographic focus of the issue, each article includes a fair amount of
concrete detail about particular places, activities, and ideas. But it is
important to understand why it would be crucial for general readersFeven readers with a statistical bentFto engage with some of
the more specialized subjects that are covered in the articles in this
issue: Estonian or Canadian language law, Russian federalism,
Turkish political parties, central European constitutional drafting,
European social law, Russians suing the state. Each of these articles
takes a particular topic in a particular place and identifies a general
mechanism that can be drawn from the specific study to add to our
catalogue of constitutional repertoires. In addition, each articleF
while focused on a particular placeFtakes a basically comparative
view. As a result, each author contributes to a more general theory
of constitutional functioning by not only providing detail and context, but also avoiding constitutional nationalism.
Constitutional nationalism? At the opposite end of the constitutional studies spectrum from the multivariate model approach
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are nationalist constitutional law, constitutional history, and constitutional theory, which tend to prevail in single-country studies. The
assumptions of a common national ‘‘we’’ in the audience for a
particular work pervade the literature. One often finds in singlecountry constitutional studies that scholars take for granted that
their own constitution is the theoretical pivot point of the legal
world, not really thinking that their national constitution may be
either distinctive in ways relevant to their explanations or similar to
other constitutions in ways that may help them see better what is
going on in their home polities. So a finding that is portrayed as
making a particular place unique and special may instead be an
indicator that the country is subject to trends visible elsewhere. The
increased activism of the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years, for
example, is more than matched by the increasing activism of courts
in other constitutional democracies (see Leslie Goldstein’s review in
this issue; Stone Sweet 2000; Guarneri & Pederzoli 2002; Hirschl
2004). Is the explanation for such activism in the United States,
then, only in the attitudes of its nine justices (especially when most
of them know full well what is happening in other countries)? Because nationalist assumptions go deep into the structure of many
single-country constitutionalist writings, such studies are rarely
translated out of their original language, and comparisons across
political systems become even harder to accomplish. Different nationally specific concepts, categories, and explanations abound
without a common sense of their shared field of action. Constitutional ethnography is, in many ways, an attempt, both literally and
conceptually, to translate concepts across sites, times, and research
questions.
The articles in this volume are refreshingly free of constitutional nationalism. In fact, they harken back to a time when it was
expected that those who studied constitutional processes would
know about a range of sites in some comparative detail. There is a
long history of comparative constitutional ethnographic writing
that these articles continue, a history that precedes the emergence
of the modern disciplines of social science. (Warning: This early
literature does not have the anti-ethnocentric self-consciousness of
contemporary social science, which against current sensibilities is
jarring.) Montesquieu’s most famous discussion about separation of
powers took comparative constitutional observations as the basis for
his claim, at heart an empirical one, about the relationship between
the institutional design and the political liberty of the individual:
In most kingdoms in Europe, the government is moderate because the prince, who has the first two powers [making laws and
executing public resolutions], leaves the exercise of the third
[judging the crimes and disputes of individuals] to his subjects.
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Among the Turks, where the three powers are united in the person of the sultan, an atrocious despotism rules. In the Italian
republics, where the three powers are united, there is less liberty
than in our monarchies. ([1748] 1989:157)

And Walter Bagehot, in the foreword to the second edition of his
classic book, The English Constitution, noted:
A contemporary writer who tries to paint what is before him is
puzzled and perplexed: what he sees is changing daily. . . . The
difficulty is the greater because the writer who deals with a living
Government naturally compares it with the most important other
living Governments, and these are changing too . . . . ([1872]
1993:268)

Bagehot took it as his task to understand the actually existing government of his day, which he could not do without reference to
what was happening to similar governments of other modern
states. From Henry Sumner Maine ([1861] 1986) to Emile
Durkheim ([1893] 1984) to Max Weber ([1925] 1968), comparative legal observation was at the heart of much of nineteenthcentury and early twentieth-century empirical work that had
theoretical ambitionFnot just in the study of law, but of society,
politics, and culture as well. Raymond Aron ([1965] 1990), Clinton
Rossiter (1948), and Carl Friedrich (1957) were just a few of the
scholars in the generation shaped by World War II and the onset of
the Cold War who carried on this tradition of combining ambitious
theoretical undertakings across a broad range of subjects with
comparative constitutional observation. As a certain vision of science evolved in both political science and sociology, however, this
sort of historical-comparative focus in constitutional studies declined, in favor of either a single-country or a multivariate approach. Constitutional ethnography attempts to recover lost
traditions, when theory-building was intimately linked to comparative/historical/legal inquiry.
Constitutional ethnography embraces nation, culture, and context as more than background assumption. As a result, one often
finds in constitutional ethnography that the problematics of nation
are embraced by foregrounding national self-conceptions in the
analysis of constitutional issues. If one asks about the United States
Supreme Court, rather than just about the Supreme Court, for
example, the nation comes into the frame and the relationship
between the Court and various conceptions of the nation, its history, and its intersections with other national trends can be more
central to the inquiry. In the articles that follow, Turkish constitutional concepts are elaborated along with Central European constitutional histories, and so on. What the articles share, and what they
enable researchers who work on other times or other places to see,
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is how national, local, and distinctive ideas modify the universalist
ambitions of abstract constitutional theory. Constitutionalism, as a
result, emerges as a set of practices in which the transnational ambitions of legal globalization flow over and modify the lived experience of specific local sites, and as a set of practices in which local
sites inescapably alter what can be seen as general meanings.
The choice of constitution to study in constitutional ethnography, then, is not given automatically by one’s own citizenship or
personal ties. Constitutional study, like ethnography more generally, relies on a conscious choice of a site or sites of analysis. If one
studies the old U.S. Constitution or the new Afghan one, or the
changing constitution of Britain or the proposals for a novel European one, or postcolonial African constitutions or post-militarydictatorship Latin American ones, it is because some feature of
these constitutions and polities in question recommends their study.
This does not mean that a researcher cannot study his or her own
constitutional regime. But it does mean that, in focusing on any
particular constitutional regime, one sees the matter as a choice. In
short, a constitutional ethnographer will choose the location for
constitutional study deliberately because of the relationship between the site and the questions asked of it and not just because he
or she happens to live in or to know a particular constitutional
order. Because constitutional sites are deliberately selected in constitutional ethnography, the broader features of these constitutional
orders come into the analysis as conscious parameters of the study.
For example, Max Weber, who was one of the key players in the
drafting of Germany’s Weimar Constitution at the end of the First
World War, used comparative constitutional observation, aided by
his detailed observation of the fate of the 1906 Russian constitution
([1906] 1995), to form the basis of both his practical work and his
broader theories (Mommsen 1984). He provided a detailed historical account of events in Russia seen from the Germany of his
day. Because of his thematic and comparative view, and because he
was able to compare constitutional development broadly across
several cases he knew well, Weber not only illuminated what was
happening in Russia at that time, but he also identified the sources
of suspicion of parliamentary government in much of Europe more
generally, something that tragically foretold the fate of the constitution he had a hand in writing (Kennedy 2004). Self-consciously
choosing a site for constitutional ethnography is a theoretical activity that itself allows more general understanding of the particular sites one seeks to illuminate.
So far, we have discussed what constitutional ethnography is
not: simply multivariate constitutional analysis without more or
purely nationalist constitutional studies. But what, you may well
ask, is constitutional ethnography?
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Let’s try for a definition, however inadequate simple definitions can be: Constitutional ethnography is the study of the central legal
elements of polities using methods that are capable of recovering the lived
detail of the politico-legal landscape.
It may help to explore the elements of this definition. The
phrase ‘‘the central legal elements of polities’’ indicates that constitutional law does not occupy all of the legal field, but only that
part of the legal field that constitutes, regulates, and modulates the
key ingredients of governance in a society. This phrase also requires distinguishing law from politics, at least in part, because
specifying the legal ‘‘elements’’ of politics presupposes that there is
more to politics than law. But this phrase also presupposes that law
is not completely contained within the concept of politics because if
law were completely contained within politics, it could not exist in
some regulative relationship to politics:
For all their necessary interaction, law and politics do not collapse
into each other, and the study of constitutional history [and constitutional ethnography] shows why it is both conceptually useful
as well as pragmatically necessary to leave theoretical space for
law and politics to come apart, as well as for each to be considered
as an influence upon the other. (Scheppele 2003:5)

The ‘‘constitutional’’ part of constitutional ethnography, then,
identifies the complex of relations between law and politics that
regulates governance. But while this most obviously leads constitutional ethnographers to focus on the state, fields of law, politics,
and governance do not have to be conceptualized as being only
about the state, though it would then require some work to identify
the politico-legal frameworks of governance in other social institutions. Much of social theory actively holds out the possibility that
the exploration of constitutions does not necessarily limit the field
in this way; as a result, one could also use a constitutional ethnographic framework to talk about the governance of corporations,
families, social groups, and transnational entities. While noting that
historically the study of legality focused on royal power, Foucault
thought it was crucial to detach law and power from the body and
idea of king so that these concepts could be concerned
with ‘‘not the king in his central position, but subjects in their reciprocal relations; not sovereignty in one edifice, but the multiple
subjugations that take place and function within the social body’’
(Foucault 1997:27). For Weber, a constitution was understood ‘‘in the
sociological sense, as the modus of distribution of power which determines the possibility of regulating social action’’ (Weber 1968:330),
a definition that can clearly be applied in more sites than the state.
Constitutional ethnography as a general idea is relatively agnostic about the proper scope and scale of study of processes of
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governance as well as about the background theoretical commitments brought to bear on the subject. In fact, in the articles contained in this issue, a variety of background theories are on display
even as all of the authors understood constitutional ethnography to
be about the study of the state. Though I focus primarily on understanding states in this introduction, analogous processes may be
at work within other social institutions.
And the ‘‘ethnography’’ part of constitutional ethnography?
While ethnography in some contexts means simply in-person, onsite fieldwork as a primary and distinctive method (for a history, see
Marcus & Fisher 1986:17–44), ethnography has been coming in
recent years to be associated with a wider range of methods that
share a common goal. Even within anthropology, the discipline
most closely associated with ethnography, for example, historicalarchival methods are increasingly in use alongside or even in substitution for traditional fieldwork (Merry 2000, 2002; Dirks 2002).
If written records are detailed enough and capture enough about
specific instances to see concretely how law, power, and governance
work, then it seems to me that there is no reason to exclude historical (or even contemporary) archive-based research from the
category of ethnography. In fact, combining archival methods with
traditional fieldwork often produces a greater richness of understanding than either one standing alone (Comaroff & Comaroff
1992; Cicourel 1967).
And the expansion of the usual core of ethnography to other
sorts of methods does not end there. Participant observation, the
method most associated with fieldwork, has always been combined
with interviewing. But as Kritzer (2002) has pointed out, interviews
and observations do not produce the same level of detail or even
generate the same picture of the practices under study. Interviews
are likely to generate less information about context than observation can because direct questions can only elicit what at some
level the researcher already knows to be important. But, as Kritzer
notes, observation has limits too: Some processes are simply not
open to the researcher’s eye, or the researcher’s eye can be myopic.
The discovery of ethnographic-level detail, then, may be enhanced
by multiple methods used together.
In fact, fieldwork has always been permeated by a mix of
methods. As John and Jean Comaroff have noted:
Ethnography is like much else in the social sciences; indeed more
so than anthropologists often acknowledge. It is a multi-dimensional exercise, a co-production of social fact and sociological imagining, a delicate engagement of the inductive with the
deductive, of the real with the virtual, of the already-known with
the surprising, of verbs with nouns, processes with products, of
the phenomenological with the political . . . [T]he key to doing
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ethnography ‘‘is ultimately a question of scale.’’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 2003:172, references omitted)

What makes ethnography a distinctive field of research activity
is the commitment to collecting whole specimens of social life. Whole
specimens? Borrowing a concept from biology, I hope to capture
the sense that the relevant sort of knowledge for ethnography can
be seen only at the level of detail captured in intact social forms as
those forms appear in the field. A ‘‘whole specimen’’ is a concept
that itself requires theoretical consideration and will depend on the
questions being asked. A whole specimen of a constitutional regime
will call for a different frame than a whole specimen of a constitutional court or an electoral system or a field of interest group
activity or the international circulation of constitutional ideas. The
crucial thing about the idea of a whole specimen is that it must be
considered in context and captured live in the field, as it were.
To clarify, let me take an example from my own research on
constitutional transformation in post-Communist states. At first,
when I embarked on a year (that turned into four) living in Hungary to study the development of the powerful constitutional court
there,1 I imagined that I was studying just a dialogue between
petitioners to the Court and the responses that the Court gave to
these petitioners, a dialogue that produced ‘‘constitutional law.’’
But, in going to work every day at the Court and seeing how enmeshed both judges and professional staff at the Court were in
broader webs of influence, it became clear that the ‘‘whole specimen’’ of Hungarian constitutional life was not just the Court and
its direct petitioners, but instead a whole set of practices that involved the Court’s relation with other institutions of state in Hungary as well as its relations with the international practices and
institutions of the transnational human rights community. In general, the Hungarian Constitutional Court took separation of powers very seriously, and justices on the Court never in principle or in
practice went to other state institutions for meetings on policy. By
contrast, many if not most judges on the Court routinely attended
meetings of European constitutional judges and constitutional
scholars, sharing ideas freely. To mark its compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, a special office at the Court
churned out memos on the applicability of European Court of
Human Rights jurisprudence to Hungarian constitutional issues.
The whole specimen of constitutional institutionalization in Hungary, then, involved much beyond the archives and building of the
Court, embracing both domestic political practices and international audiences in different measure.
1
Under National Science Foundation grants # SBE 94-11889 and SBE 95-14174
(SGER).
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But this lesson doesn’t immediately translate into a common
model of constitutional influence, even in other post-Communist
states. When, several years later, I went to Russia to study the same
thing2Fthe letters from petitioners to the Constitutional Court and
the Court’s response to petitionersFI found that the boundaries of
the whole specimen of constitutional institutionalization was quite
different. Only a few of the judges and professional staff members
spoke foreign languages and traveled to academic conferences, and
the Court as a whole was rather walled off from international influence. Most professionals working at the Court seemed to treat
international ideas with a great deal of suspicion. For example,
though Russia had become a signatory to the European Convention
on Human Rights, some judges and staff routinely grumbled about
how impossible (some actually said undesirable) it was to have to be
bound by a jurisprudence that was in a foreign language. In Russia,
however, domestic political influences loomed largeFfrom the
physical presence of a representative of the ‘‘presidential administration’’ and a representative from each house of the Parliament
in regular assigned offices in the building to routine twice-yearly
private meetings between the Russian President and the judges on
the Court, both practices that would have been unthinkable in
Hungary. What I had learned was that routine practice in Hungary
(where the judges overtly aligned themselves with the international
human rights community and kept domestic political influences at
bay) turned out to be nearly the opposite in Russia (where members of other branches of government were given offices in the
building but international human rights institutions and practices
were considered foreign influences best kept at arm’s length).
It is quite difficult to imagine how to have studied this from afar
using variable-based models unless one already understood how
the institutions worked. I would never have thought to ask, based
on my experience in Hungary, whether a representative of the
nation’s president had an office in the country’s highest court. But
understanding how the Hungarian Court functioned was deepened through the contrast with the Russian Court and vice versa.
In-person and on-site observation, combined with interviews and
with going through the archives, was the only way to tease out
these relationships, and only then because the combination of
methods could reconstruct individuals and institutions in their
natural habitats, as it were, and could follow their lived experience
through to see how a whole variety of influences intersected over
concrete actions, decisions, and patterns.
Given the tendency of models to mislead in the absence of
deep knowledge or ethnographic observation, starting with a
2

Under National Science Foundation grant # SBE 01–11963.
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variable-based model might be dangerous to understanding rather
than productive of it. Generally, when such models work, it is because the researcher already has a deep knowledge of the potential
mechanisms in play, at least for the researcher’s own constitutional
culture. Comparative variable-based analysis often extrapolates
one distinctive culture into others in ways that can seriously mislead.
But because the variable-based model tends to take whole specimens
with which one is familiar, cut them up into pieces called variables,
and then put them back together in the context of specimens with
which one has no firsthand knowledge, the relationships found can
be, without more, an essentially fictional form of correlation.
Fictional? Isn’t that a strong attack on those forms of social
science that aspire to models? The point is made elegantly by
Nancy Cartwright’s analysis of physics (1983), an even more model-driven field than sociolegal studies. Cartwright shows that ‘‘fundamental equations do not govern objects in reality; they only
govern objects in models’’ (1983:129). The need to disaggregate
observations into pieces and to simplify the number of pieces one
can include in a model guarantee that the model will never be
literally true, according to Cartwright. As a result, a model that
specifies the formal relationship between a, b, and c may describe a
factual state of the world that does not actually exist in any individual instance. Hence her titleF‘‘how the laws of physics lie’’For
as she notes, ‘‘[t]here is a trade-off between factual content and
explanatory power’’ (1983:72). Powerful models achieve their
power at the expense of representing any particular individual
instance adequately. As a result, ‘‘[t]hings are made to look the same
only when we fail to examine them too closely’’ (1983:19). Quantitative models that see relations among variables may discover
‘‘laws’’ that may not be true in any single actually existing case.
The only way to adequately represent any particular instance,
then, is to represent it as a complex and potentially contradictory
intertwining of institutions, individuals, sensibilities, histories, and
meanings. This does not preclude counting aspects of the whole
specimen. Constitutions, for example, can be meaningfully distinguished by the number of state institutions they set up, ranging
from the simple United States text, which explicitly establishes only
one court in the federal judiciary, to the more complicated South
African constitution, which includes detailed constitutional regulation of many more bodies of state in general and many more courts
in particular.
But sometimes counting can hide what is going on rather than
illuminate it. To take another example from my own fieldwork, a
quantitative researcher working on another project wanted to
know the percentage of dissents in a variety of high courts because
of a hypothesis that this would reveal the extent of fundamental
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disagreement among judges about constitutional conceptions,
something that itself might vary across constitutional cultures.
The researcher asked me for this number for Hungary. I had
never calculated this number when I worked at the Hungarian
Constitutional Court, because I thought that the number was
meaningless. Virtually all the decisions of the Court were unanimous, unless the case dealt with social welfare rights, in which case
the Court at that time divided 5–4 for ideological reasons. And
since this Court had no discretionary jurisdiction, the number of
social welfare cases producing a 5–4 split said more about the
number of petitioners raising such issues than about the extent of
judicial disagreement or the salience of the topic to the judges (as it
might revealed in the United States, where the highest court has
discretionary jurisdiction).
Beyond the welfare cases, there was a scattering of dissents, but
they were all from the same judge, who had extensive personal
conflicts with the president of the Court at that time. When this
judge was very angry with the president, he labeled his frequent
separate opinions as dissents; if the other judges succeeded in
talking him out of it, he labeled the very same opinion a concurrence. (This information came from my interviews with judges, and
also from working in the building, where fits of pique on the part of
particular judges at the Court could be observed.) The overall dissent rate, then, was a combination of the actual number of social
welfare cases brought to the Court and the daily state of the personal relations among particular judges. As a result, the number
simply did not reflect the intensity or frequency of differences in
fundamental values among the judges except on one issue, and
then not in proportion to the number of cases that raised this
particular point. The percentage of cases producing a dissent, as a
result, was a number that couldn’t mean what the other investigator
might think. In another constitutional system, depending on a variety of specific factors, it might well reveal what the investigator
thought it did. But the comparison across systems without this detailed knowledge struck me as being more dangerous than helpful.
That is not a general point about quantitative methods, however, because understanding a constitutional space may well include counting, which can be just as ethnographic in spirit as verbal
description is. Ethnographic counting requires a particular theoretical sensibility, however, and it requires embedding the numbers
in a broader account of the individual case. For example, the percentage of professional staff at a high court who spoke foreign
languages might well be a decent measure of the potential international influences on these courts, since without language skills
much of the literature on international human rights would have
been simply inaccessible for consideration. If such a sensibility
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about counting is based on nuanced knowledge of particular instances and the way they work, there is no principled reason to
exclude numerical data from the category of ethnography, since
the ethnographic concern is more with the level of detail of knowledge rather than with the form in which it comes. As a result, when
‘‘ethnography’’ is defined as the ‘‘methods capable of recovering
the lived detail of the. . . . landscape,’’ it is catholic about both form
and method of acquisition (observing, interviewing, reading, and
counting) while still identifying the sorts of things that have to be in
view (the lived detail of the landscape).
So then why privilege the ‘‘lived detail of the politico-legal
landscape’’ over other forms of knowledge, since this is the bit of
the definition that does all of the methodological work? If constitutional ethnography is the contextually detailed, empirical study
of particular constitutional systems, along with their histories, politics, cultural meanings, and social supports, its aim is to illuminate
constitutional theory by reference to ‘‘thick’’ accounts (Geertz
1971). This means studying actual constitutional regimes to see
how theoretical questions are answered in particular instances
rather than resorting to either abstract constitutional principles or
small-variable accounts of complex systems of governance. But that
still begs the question of why thick accounts are preferable.
At the level at which constitutional knowledge is typically invokedFwhen comprehending existing constitutional systems or
attempting to design new onesFknowing more about fewer cases
tends to be more valuable than knowing less about more cases.
That is because a great deal is at stake in individual constitutional
systems that might be the object of study. It won’t do, in general, to
have only a far-off, merely statistical sense of how state structures
work. Each constitutional system matters in ways that make it particularly catastrophic to get individual cases wrong. Lumping all
post-Communist constitutional systems together, for example,
would badly misstate the degree of difference among legal cultures quite similar from a distance. From my own observation,
Hungary is more similar to Germany than it is to Russia, which is in
turn more similar to France, for example. Alternatively, grouping
systems that share certain structural features can also mistake the
degree of similarity. For example, one might assume that systems
that have supreme courts instead of constitutional courts would
share certain other family resemblances, but that would underestimate the similarity between Canada (with a supreme court) and
South Africa (with a constitutional court) because they have a common constitutional language that is pivotal in rights cases. Like the
stock market adage ‘‘Buy lowFsell high,’’ which is elegantly simple
and yet hard to follow in the event, the ethnographic adage ‘‘See
particularFthink general’’ is also difficult to accomplish in actual
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methodological practice. That does not, of course, make it bad
advice.
All that said, what have our authors done in their pieces in this
issue? All have followed the ethnographic adage of looking particularly and thinking generally. They have given us a great deal of
particular detail about particular places while keeping in mind the
general concern with repertoires and themes that characterizes
excellent ethnographic research. We learn in each piece about
particular constitutional settingsFincluding Russia, Estonia, Turkey, Canada, the European Union, and post-socialist Central EuropeFwhile simultaneously learning about more general
constitutional processes that might illuminate sites not specifically
in focus here.
Given our focus on constitutional repertoires, the articles are
grouped around three different constitutional problematics: (1)
‘‘Constitutional Edges,’’ (2) ‘‘Constitutional Articulation,’’ and (3)
‘‘States, Courts, and Publics.’’ ‘‘Constitutional Edges’’ engages ways
of defining the boundaries of a constitutional field, ‘‘Constitutional
Articulation’’ focuses on the relations among different levels of
complex constitutional sites, and ‘‘States, Courts, and Publics’’
highlights the way that courts figure in defining the relationship
between the individual and the state.
The two articles in ‘‘Constitutional Edges’’ examine the way in
which the boundaries of constitutional orders are constituted. Jiřı́
Přibáň’s article, ‘‘Reconstituting Paradise Lost,’’ explores the ways
that constitution writers in post-socialist Central Europe understood the history that they were continuing through their constitutive actions. Constitution makers, in Přibáň’s analysis, faced a
choice between ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity,
both of which had modern histories in the region but each of which
implicated the other in some way. Přibáň’s examination of the different constitutional processes in the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Poland, and Hungary show how differently these alternatives and
their possible combinations could be imagined and how, in choosing a constitutional future, each set of constitution makers was also
choosing a constitutional past. Dicle Kogacioglu’s study of the dissolution of political parties by the Constitutional Court in Turkey,
‘‘Progress, Unity, and Democracy,’’ focuses on the way in which
these key concepts are understood in the process of defining the
legitimate ideological boundaries of the state. The Turkish Constitutional Court is assigned the task of dissolving anti-constitutional
political parties, which gives it pride of place in defining both what
the constitution means and also what is intolerable within the constitutional order. As Kogacioglu shows, the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court does more than simply embroider constitutional clausesFit weaves the very fabric of Turkish democracy.
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Both Přibáň’s and Kogacioglu’s articles illuminate different ways in
which a constitutional order can come to define its own edges, and
together they show how present constitutional moments represent
the intersection of imagined constitutional pasts and imagined
constitutional futures.
In the second section of this issue, ‘‘Constitutional Articulation,’’ three articles examine how different levels of complex constitutional orders are related to each other. Nancy Maveety and
Anke Grosskopf ’s article, ‘‘‘Constrained’ Constitutional Courts as
Conduits,’’ focuses on the Estonian Constitutional Tribunal and the
politically sensitive decisions it made in the 1990s on language
rights in Estonia. With a sizeable Russian minority that represented
the former colonial power in Estonia, the new nation’s leaders were
as eager to exclude these interlopers as the European Union,
which Estonia aspired to join, was determined to ensure nondiscrimination. Between the domestic political pressures for exclusion
and the transnational political pressures for inclusion, the Estonian
Constitutional Tribunal acted as a ‘‘conduit’’ that enabled a workable compromise to be reached. Maveety and Grosskopf show how
constitutional courts can assist constitutional articulation by translating from one constitutional language to another. Rachel Cichowski’s article, ‘‘Women’s Rights, the European Court, and Supranational Constitutionalism,’’ also examines the relationship between
European-level law and national-level law, highlighting the contested issue of gender equity as an example. On this issue, national
and European courts have colluded, dragging the sometimes reluctant member state governments along with them. Cichowski’s
article and the Maveety and Grosskopf article show how courts are
particularly well-suited to speeding integration across political levels. Alexei Trochev’s article, ‘‘Less Democracy, More Courts,’’ adds
a useful corrective and complication to this picture. In Russia, the
eighty-nine regions (roughly the equivalent of states) were given
the power to create their own constitutional courts, but while a
majority of the regions included constitutional courts in their regional constitutions, only seventeen actually created such courts,
and two of those failed. What accounts for why some regions actually introduced constitutional courts and others did not? Trochev
highlights aspects of the local political situation in each case, demonstrating convincingly that the regions that had the greatest entrenchment of their local executives had the greatest likelihood of
starting these courts. Trochev’s conclusion is that courts are used
not to mediate between the center and the regions or even between
executives and legislatures within the regions but are used instead
to shore up entrenched executive power and to defend it from
challenge. As a result, the less democratic choice there is within a
region, the more likely there is to be a constitutional court. This
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article provides a useful counterweight to the other two in this
section, for it shows that courts do not necessarily mediate among
political levels. Instead, they may be created precisely to defend
particular constitutional institutions against others.
In the final section, ‘‘States, Courts, and Publics,’’ two articles
point to the different ways that individual citizens can use courts to
leverage their influence over political officials. Peter Solomon’s article, ‘‘Judicial Power in Russia,’’ examines the many ways that individuals can sue state officials so that Solomon can generate some
measure of the independence of courts from state power. Solomon
finds that success rates for individuals suing state officials ranged
from around 80% in the general courts and up to 90% in military
courts to a bit less than 50% in the economic courts and only 25%
when handled by the procuracy. By looking at the range of cases
and the range of possible venues, Solomon paints a nuanced picture of the relative independence of courts and, indirectly, shows
how the courts create a vector for influence by individuals in state
processes. With an entirely different issue in a very different legal
culture, Troy Riddell shows much the same with respect to language rights in Canada. In ‘‘The Impact of Legal Mobilization and
Judicial Decisions,’’ Riddell examines the impact of the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Canada on the realization of minority language rights in the public schools. Court decisions in hand, active
parents were able to get school districts throughout Canada to
provide the required educational opportunities for Francophone
students outside Quebec. Solomon’s article focuses on individual
cases and their respective success rates while Riddell’s article
focuses on interest group mobilization before and after key court
decisions, but both show how turning to the judiciary can help
citizens hold state officials to their constitutional obligations.
There were, of course, other ways that these articles could be
arranged together, ways that might have highlighted different
common or competing constitutional mechanisms. For example,
Solomon’s article on Russia shows how national-level courts exercise substantial independence from political officials, as seen in the
rates with which judges ruled against officials when citizens
brought suit. But Trochev’s article on Russia highlights the political dependence of the regional courts in the same country. Kogacioglu’s article highlights the way in which the Turkish Constitutional Court created an inward-looking nationalist definition of
democracy, while Maveety and Grosskopf show how the Estonian
Constitutional Tribunal opened up Estonian constitutionalism to
the claims of European institutions. Přibáň’s article shows how understandings of history guided constitutional processes, while
Cichowski’s article reveals how absolutely new transnational law
has supplanted more traditional national law even in an area as
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sensitive as gender equity. Both for Riddell as for Maveety and
Grosskopf, language rights are central to the constitution of new
democratic publics, while for Kogacioglu, democratic ideology in
Turkey is constructed precisely in excluding the special claims of
the minority language population. The care with which the authors
in this issue have illustrated the specifics of place provide the
readers of these articles with many ways to assess and recombine
the insights provide here.
Since so many of our articles focus on the role of courts in
constituting and sustaining constitutional orders, it is only fitting
that the review essay for our issue should take on three new books
that contain broadly comparative analyses of the roles of judges in
constitutional systems. Our reviewer, Leslie Goldstein, has highlighted the mechanisms through which judges exercise influence in
political contexts, which provides a broader perspective against
which to locate our more detailed case studies.
I should mention that while this issue begins with something
like a methodological manifesto, these articles were not screened
on the basis of any such manifesto. In response to a very open call
for papers, the Law & Society Review received many excellent submissions. Each of the articles selected for this issue went through a
rigorous refereeing process that included a minimum of two
rounds of external review by referees who had no manifesto before
them. A wide range of referees participated in this process of providing feedback to authors, and I am grateful to them. The collection that resulted is, in my view, excellent; what I most regret
about this process is that other wonderful examples of constitutional ethnography were screened out along the way.
This introduction, while I think it describes the articles in this
special issue, by no means commits the authors of these articles to
the vision outlined here. Since the introduction was written only
after the other articles were done, the authors not only did not, but
they could not have, adjust(ed) their inquiries to the concerns outlined here. The articles stand on their own as the work of their
creators. This introduction provides one framing of these pieces,
but it is not the only frame there is.
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